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Blind quantum computation protocols allow a user with limited quantum technology to delegate
an intractable computation to a quantum server while keeping the computation perfectly secret.
Whereas in some protocols a user can verify that calculated outcomes are correct, a third party
cannot do this, which allows a dishonest user or owner to benefit illegally. I propose a new blind
quantum computation protocol with a new property called public verifiability, which enables any
third party to assure that a party does not benefit from attempted deception.
Blind quantum computation (BQC) protocols [1–13]
allow Alice, who has no quantum computer, to use quan-
tum computation without buying one or sacrificing her
privacy. In these protocols, if Alice has weak quantum
devices, such as a single qubit generator, she will be able
to delegate an intractable computation to Bob’s quantum
server, keeping the computation perfectly secret. Several
BQC protocols [1, 2, 5–10] have been given an additional
property, called verifiability. Although he cannot obtain
the outcome of the computation, evil Bob will try to
deceive Alice and send an incorrect outcome. The veri-
fiability property enables her to detect whether a given
outcome is correct, even though she cannot recheck the
outcome itself. Existing verifiable BQC protocols were
given the property in essentially the same method as
follows [5]. For traps, Alice secretly adds independent
trivial parts to her desired computation. She knows the
expected outcomes of those computations. Because Bob
does not know where the traps are placed, there is only
a small probability that he can tamper with her compu-
tation without being caught in one.
When Alice detects the incorrect outcome, it is natu-
ral that she rebuke Bob for cheating and reject paying
his server fee. However, if the rejection is allowed, a fur-
ther problem may arise. Assume the rejection of the fee
is allowed, and Bob is honest, but Alice wants to be a
free rider (i.e., she wants to obtain the outcome of the
computation without paying for it). Her winning strat-
egy is simple: follow the verifiable BQC protocol and
say “Bob cheats”, ignoring the outcomes of the traps.
Unfortunately, because the aforementioned verification
method uses her private information, existing verifiable
BQC protocols provide methods of detecting the incor-
rect outcome only for Alice; thus, a third party, even a
court, cannot verify whether Bob really cheats and can-
not settle the dispute. Even if a court orders her to give
evidence against Bob when the conflict arises, BQC pro-
tocols allow the would-be free rider to forge it, because
the protocols perfectly conceal what she does. Indeed,
a no-go theorem suggests that it is impossible to uncon-
ditionally resolve the conflict [14]. However, it remains
possible to resolve it computationally. Here, with the
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aid of classical cryptography, I propose a new verifiable
BQC protocol based on an existing verifiable BQC pro-
tocol. Without any additional assumption, this proto-
col preserves the properties of the original protocol (e.g.,
perfect security, unconditional verifiability, and the prob-
ability that Alice will detect Bob’s attempt to deceive).
Furthermore, if Alice has no quantum memory, the proto-
col satisfies a further property that any third party with
a classical computer can unconditionally detect Bob’s at-
tempt to deceive and computationally detect Alice’s de-
ception. I call this property “public verifiability”. Be-
cause of this property, any third party can judge whether
Alice should pay. My protocol is the first verifiable BQC
protocol with such a property and enables users in an
era of first-generation quantum computers to use them
without absurd costs.
Before revealing my protocol, I briefly review the verifi-
able BQC Fitzsimons–Kashefi (FK) protocol [5] on which
my protocol is based. That protocol uses measurement-
based quantum computation (MBQC) [15] and proceeds
as follows. First, Alice sends Bob single qubit states,
from which Bob constructs a graph state. Almost all sin-
gle qubit states are rotated by random angles, but she se-
cretly chooses the locations of trap qubits, and all qubits
that neighbor any of the traps are set to |0〉 or |1〉 so
that the trap qubits are separated from the other qubits.
Then, for each qubit, Alice decides a measurement an-
gle and sends it to Bob, who measures the qubit in the
angle and sends back the measurement result. The mea-
surement angle δi is adjusted to not only the previous
measurement results {bj}j<i as the usual feed-forward
process in MBQC, but also to the random rotation angle
θi by
δi = (−1)bXi+rXiφi+θi′+π
∑
j∈Zi
(bj+rj) (mod 2π) (1)
where φi is the original computational angle, rj is a ran-
dom bit hiding the measurement result, θi
′ = θi + πri,
and subscripts Xi, Zi are sets determined by the graph
and denote bit summations. Alice sets φt = 0 for each
trap qubit. Finally, she accepts the outcome of the com-
putation if bt = rt for any trap t. Notice that the FK
protocol requires Alice to have no quantum device except
for a single qubit generator.
BQC protocols are required to be blind (if Alice re-
2spects the protocol, Bob cannot learn anything about
her computation no matter what he does) and correct (if
all parties respect the protocol, it does not abort and Al-
ice obtains the correct outcome). In the FK protocol, the
random angles {θi} and random bits {ri} make the proto-
col blind, and the angle adjustment (1) makes it correct.
Note that δt is equal to θt+πrt and thus bt should equal
rt for any trap t. Moreover, the secret separations of the
trap qubits from the others provide unconditional verifi-
ability. A BQC protocol is considered ǫ-verifiable if the
probability of overlooking Bob’s attempt to deceive does
not exceed ǫ regardless of what he does. Although the
FK protocol does not specify which graph state is used,
with the dotted-complete graph state and a computa-
tion encoded in a fault-tolerant manner, the FK protocol
achieves ǫ = (2/3)⌈2/5d⌉ with security parameter d [5].
The purpose of this paper is to determine a novel BQC
protocol satisfying a new property: public verifiability.
Let us first describe its setting. In addition to Alice and
Bob, I consider a third party who can collect all clas-
sical messages sent between Alice and Bob. Based on
the messages alone, the third party judges whether the
correct outcome is obtained by Alice. When Alice and
Bob broadcast all their classical messages, anyone can
work as a third party, and I therefore do not consider
a cheating third party. Alice or Bob may be evil, but I
ignore the case where both are evil. Evil Alice attempts
to make a third party judge that the outcome is incorrect
and to learn something about the delegated computation.
She can secretly embed her desired computation within a
larger computation, and this may be enough for her to ob-
tain some partial information. Moreover, she may know
some information about the computation before starting
the protocol, and she can use this to learn the desired
information. I assume that her computational ability is
the same as that of a classical computer, and hence the
outcome of the delegated computation is classical. This
assumption is justified by the fact that she delegates her
computation via a BQC protocol. If she is powerful, she
can compute it herself. Public verifiability claims that
an evil party will fail to achieve its purpose. Let ξ be a
number less than one. A BQC protocol is said to be ξ-
publicly verifiable if (1) the probability that a third party
wrongly judges that Alice obtains the correct outcome is
bounded by ξ and (2) when Bob is honest and a third
party judges that Alice does not obtain the correct out-
come, Alice cannot obtain any non-negligible partial in-
formation about the delegated computation. The precise
definition, with a cryptographic flavor, can be found in
the Appendix. One may think that although Alice has no
quantum computer, she will still be able to use another
quantum server to attack the protocol and obtain the
outcome. However, in that case, she cannot benefit from
the deception. If the server requires her to use a publicly
verifiable BQC protocol, she has to pay the server for the
outcome, as she cannot obtain it otherwise. Therefore, I
ignore this type of attack.
I will now describe my protocol, which uses a classical
probabilistic public-key encryption scheme. The proto-
col does not depend on which encryption scheme is used,
provided that it satisfies four requirements, which I will
impose later. For simplicity, I assume that when receiv-
ing messages, Alice or Bob checks the validity of messages
and aborts if any of them is found to be invalid. The
protocol runs as follows. (I) Alice selects a graph G and
randomly sets the locations of traps T from the vertices
V . She also chooses uniformly randomly {di}i∈NG(T ) and
{θi}i∈V from {0, 1} and {kπ/4 | k = 0, . . . , 7}, respec-
tively, where NG(T ) is the neighborhood of T . She an-
nounces the graph G and sends Bob single qubit states
{|qi〉}i∈V where
|qi〉 =
{ |di〉 (i ∈ NG(T ))∏
j∈NG(i)∩NG(T )
Zdj |+θi〉 (i /∈ NG(T )) (2)
and |+θj〉 = 1/
√
2(|0〉+ eiθj |1〉). Bob receives the qubits
and applies controlled-Z gates to the adjoining pairs of
qubits in the graph G. (II) For the i-th qubit, Alice com-
putes a ciphertext δ
pki−1
i of the i-th measurement angle
δi by the i− 1-th public key pki−1 and sends it. Here,
the ciphertext δpk01 is the plaintext δ1 itself. Bob de-
crypts it, measures the qubit with δi, and obtains the
measurement result bi. Then, he generates a pair com-
prising a public key pki and a secret key ski with security
parameter n, encrypts bi using pki, and sends back pki
and the ciphertext bpkii . They repeat the above for all
qubits. (III) Alice announces T and the expected results
{rt}t∈T . Then, Bob checks the associated results {bt}t∈T
and announces all secret keys {ski}i∈V if bt = rt for all
t ∈ T . She decrypts all received messages using the se-
cret keys and accepts the outcome of the computation if
all secret keys and all messages from Bob are valid and
bt = rt for all t ∈ T . (IV) A third party judges Alice
to have obtained the correct outcome if Bob reveals the
secret keys, all secret keys and messages from Bob are
valid, and bt = rt for all t ∈ T .
The major difference between my protocol and the FK
protocol is that Alice and Bob encrypt their classical mes-
sages. Intuitively, the changes allow third-party verifica-
tion for the following reason. The encryption of Bob’s
messages renders Alice unable to obtain the outcome un-
til Bob verifies that the traps are untouched and she then
receives the secret key. To obtain the secret key, even evil
Alice has to announce the true traps and hence cannot
cheat; otherwise, Bob aborts the protocol. A third party
can check whether Alice obtains the correct outcome us-
ing the disclosed information about the traps.
I will now prove that my protocol is a verifiable BQC
protocol that satisfies public verifiability. Before doing
so, I first discuss the four requirements for an encryption
scheme, as promised: (i) Alice can compute δ
pki−1
i from
φi, θi, Xi, Zi, {rj}j≤i, {pkj}j<i, and {b
pkj
j }j<i. (ii) Even
if Bob sends ill-formed public keys and/or ciphertexts of
messages and Alice is unaware of the illegality, her mes-
sages encrypted by the public keys do not reveal any in-
formation other than the desired angles. (iii) Any public
3key has a unique secret key, and anyone can confirm that
a given pair of a possibly invalid public key and a possibly
invalid secret key is genuine. (iv) The scheme is semanti-
cally secure [16, 17], which guarantees that any ciphertext
includes only negligible information about its plaintext.
More precisely, for any two distinct plaintexts x, y, there
is only a negligible difference between the probabilities
that Alice guesses given ciphertexts of x and y to be the
ciphertext of x. The first three requirements are needed
to confirm that my protocol is a verifiable BQC protocol,
i.e., it is correct, blind, and verifiable; the last require-
ment will be used to prove that my protocol is publicly
verifiable. While my protocol is independent of a choice
of encryption scheme as long as it satisfies the require-
ments, the reader may question whether such a good en-
cryption scheme really exists. Fortunately, it is possible
to tailor ElGamal encryption [18] to the protocol using
inattentive evaluations [19]. The scheme satisfies require-
ments (i–iii) with no additional assumption. Moreover,
it is semantically secure under the widely-held DDH as-
sumption [20]. The detail of the encryption scheme can
be found in the Appendix.
I will now prove that my protocol is a verifiable BQC
protocol. Recall that the underlying FK protocol is a
ǫ-verifiable BQC protocol with some ǫ. Because of the
existence of requirement (i) and the fact that the FK
protocol is correct, it is easy to see that my protocol is
also correct. Note that Alice should not be able to com-
pute δi itself. As discussed before, it is essential for my
protocol that she cannot obtain the measurement results
without the secret keys, but Equation (1) shows she can
compute {bi} from {δi} and values she already has. Next,
I show that my protocol is blind. The knowledge of Bob
in my protocol increases by {δpki−1i }, T , and {rt} from
the FK protocol. The location of traps T and the ex-
pected measurement outcomes of traps {rt} are selected
randomly and independently of what Alice computes, so
Bob learns nothing about her computation from them.
Requirement (ii) ensures that what Bob extracts from
the messages is, at most, {δi}, which he can obtain with
the FK protocol. Hence, his knowledge of Alice’s compu-
tation is the same as in the FK protocol. Finally, I show
that my protocol is ǫ-verifiable. In my protocol, Bob re-
ceives the messages about the traps. He can use the infor-
mation to create fake secret keys so that Alice decrypts
bpktt using the fake secret keys and obtains rt, although
bt 6= rt. Requirement (iii) excludes such a possibility.
Under this requirement, Bob cannot use the information
about the traps for attacks because Alice already has all
the measurement results before she discloses the traps,
so Bob cannot change them. Moreover, any strategy by
Bob that uses ill-formed keys or messages fails to deceive
Alice. Because Alice can decrypt all messages at the end
of my protocol, it can be assumed without loss of gener-
ality that she decides whether she accepts the outcome
using only the plaintexts. This means that Bob can do
nothing that he cannot already do in the FK protocol to
succeed in forcing Alice to accept the incorrect outcome.
Hence, my protocol is ǫ-verifiable.
I now show that my protocol is ǫ-publicly verifiable.
One of the conditions is easily satisfied. Because a third
party uses the same method as Alice to decide whether
to accept the outcome, the third party can detect Bob’s
deception if and only if Alice can detect it, provided that
Alice follows the protocol. To satisfy the other condi-
tion, I need to ensure that Alice cannot obtain any non-
negligible partial information without the secret keys.
For this purpose, I weaken Alice. I assume that Alice
has no quantum memory. The assumption excludes the
possibility that she constructs a secret quantum channel
and reads out the measurement results directly. Even
if she can send one of the entangled qubits to do that,
she cannot maintain the entanglement. Now, let {δi} be
the computation. If Bob follows the protocol and a third
party rejects the outcome, Alice cannot obtain the secret
keys because a third party always accepts the outcome
when Bob announces the secret keys. Hence, in such a
case, all she obtains is the public keys {pki} and the en-
crypted measurement results {bpkii }. Note that the i-th
public key is chosen after the i-th measurement bi, so
pki is independent of bi and any other information about
{δi}. Let us consider a case where Bob sends the ci-
phertexts of 1 by {pki} instead of {bpkii }. If Alice can
extract some non-negligible information about {δi} from
{bpkii }, she can distinguish between that case and a case
where Bob actually sends {bpkii } with a non-negligible
probability. However, this contradicts requirement (iv).
Therefore, I conclude that the protocol is ǫ-publicly ver-
ifiable.
In this paper, I proposed a new verifiable BQC protocol
based on the FK protocol. In comparison, my protocol
preserves all properties of the FK protocol without any
additional assumptions; it also offers public verifiability.
However, to achieve public verifiability, my protocol re-
quires messages to be much longer. The disadvantage is
not serious; although the messages are long in my pro-
tocol, their total size is polynomial in the size of the
messages in the FK protocol. This means that any com-
putation efficiently executable in the FK protocol is also
efficiently executable in my protocol. Furthermore, ho-
momorphic encryption schemes [17, 21, 22] can be used
and the size can be reduced if blindness is made to hold
under some assumptions [23] or we give up perfect blind-
ness [4].
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4Appendix A: Definition of public verifiability
Let ξ be a real number such that 0 ≤ ξ < 1. A BQC
protocol is said to be ξ-publicly verifiable if there is a
polynomial-time algorithm, which is called the public
verification procedure, that computes “accept” or “re-
ject” from all classical messages in the protocol and satis-
fies the following two conditions when the computational
ability of Alice does not exceed one of a probabilistic
classical computer.
1. The probability that the procedure outputs “ac-
cept” but Alice does not obtain the correct out-
come is not more than ξ provided that she follows
the protocol.
2. There exists a simulator of Alice such that for
any her computation {δi} and any function hn, fn,
there is only a negligible difference between the
probability that Alice correctly computes fn({δi})
from hn({δi}), {δi}, and the messages she ob-
tains in an execution of the protocol with honest
Bob where the public verification procedure out-
puts “reject” and the probability that the simula-
tor correctly computes fn({δi}) from hn({δi}) and
{δi}. Here, the difference is negligible with respect
to n, and all |{δi}|, |hn({δi})|, and |fn({δi})| are
polynomially bounded with respect to n.
It is easy to modify the proof in the main body to
prove that my protocol is publicly verifiable with this
definition.
Appendix B: Encryption scheme
ElGamal encryption is one of the best-known forms
of probabilistic, public-key encryption scheme, and uses
the difficulty in computing discrete logarithms. Although
a quantum computer computes discrete logarithms effi-
ciently [24], Alice cannot use a quantum computer to de-
crypt ciphertexts as discussed above. ElGamal encryp-
tion satisfies all requirements except the first one [20].
While ElGamal encryption is known to be multiplica-
tively homomorphic, it is ill-defined in my setting. As
I use bitwise encoding, it is enough for the computa-
tion (1) to evaluate a formula (α1∨α2)⊕(α3∨α4), where
αj ∈ {0, 1, bXi, bZi ,¬bXi ,¬bZi}. To evaluate it, I used
inattentive evaluations, which render secret evaluations
of log-depth circuits possible using inductive construc-
tion. Inattentive evaluations require Bob to send (0, 1) or
(1, 0) instead of 0 or 1, respectively, so evil Bob sends ill-
formed messages such as (0, 0) and possibly obtains par-
tial information about the dependency of the above log-
ical formula on bXi and bZi . Although a non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof [25] was employed in the original
paper [19], I do not use it here, because it requires the
additional assumption that all parties share a common
reference string. I modified the method such that Al-
ice encodes a bit using the received messages and uses it
instead of the plain bit. This can make her message com-
pletely meaningless when Bob sends an ill-formed mes-
sage.
Specifically, with a prime pi where 2pi + 1 is also a
prime, the i-th public key pki is a trio of the cyclic sub-
group Hi of order pi of Z2pi+1, a generator gi of Hi,
and a randomly selected element gxii of Hi. The as-
sociated secret key ski is xi. Let 0
∗
i ≡ (gxiri , gri ) and
1∗i ≡ (gmi gxiri , gri ) with randomly selected r and m 6= 0.
The ciphertext bpkii of the i-th measurement result bi is
(b∗i , c
∗
i ) where b = bi and c = 1 − bi. Next, Alice com-
putes δ
pki−1
i . As discussed above, she inductively com-
putes (α1 ∨ α2) ⊕ (α3 ∨ α4). She encodes a bit value
using given ciphertexts at the zeroth level, computes bit
summation of them at the first level, computes logical
disjunction of them at the second level, and finally takes
bit summation of them at the third level. At the zero
level, Alice encodes a bit into four pairs of bits: she en-
codes 0 into four pairs three of which are (0, 0) or (1, 1)
and one of which is (0, 1) or (1, 0); 1 into three (0, 1) or
(1, 0) and one (0, 0) or (1, 1). Specifically, she creates 0i,
1i, bi, and ¬bi where
0i ≡ {(b∗i , 0∗i ), (c∗i , 0∗i ), (b∗i , b∗i ), (b∗i , b∗i )} (B1)
1i ≡ {(b∗i , 0∗i ), (c∗i , 0∗i ), (b∗i , c∗i ), (b∗i , c∗i )} (B2)
bi ≡ {(b∗i , 0∗i ), (b∗i , 0∗i ), (b∗i , b∗i ), (b∗i , c∗i )} (B3)
¬bi ≡ {(c∗i , 0∗i ), (c∗i , 0∗i ), (b∗i , b∗i ), (b∗i , c∗i )}. (B4)
In the first level, Alice uses an i-length bit sequence whose
bit summation denotes its value. For bXi , she creates an
i-length sequence, {aj}j<i, where aj is bj if j ∈ Xi; oth-
erwise, it is 0j. To denote the negation of it, she just
flips the value of a0. The encoding of the second level
is the same flavor as that in the zero level. She encodes
α ∨ β into {(α, 0), (β, 0), (α, β), (1, 0)}. Finally, in the
third level, she forms a pair as she did in the first level,
and she finishes evaluating the desired formula. Before
sending it, Alice randomize it so that Bob cannot ob-
tain any information other than δi. For the given cipher-
text (gsj , g
r
j ), she can create a new random ciphertext
(gsy+xzj , g
ry+z
j ) of the same plaintext without knowing
the plaintext with randomly selected y 6= 0 and z. She
permutes pairs in the zeroth and second levels, flips even
number of bits in the first level, and, in the second level,
she both permutes pairs and flips even number of bits.
It is easy to check that Bob can extract δi from the
above δ
pki−1
i . The validity of public key can be checked in
polynomial-time and the secret key is unique. Therefore,
the above construction satisfies the third requirement.
Next, I will see the construction satisfies the second re-
quirement. If Bob sends the well-formed messages, the
property of inattentive evaluation guarantees that Bob
obtain nothing other than δi [19]. Note that he knows
that Alice computes (α1 ∨α2)⊕ (α3 ∨α4) and the shape
of the formula is not secret. The validity of a ciphertext
5of ElGamal encryption is easily checked. Therefore, all
evil Bob can do is sending (0∗i , 0
∗
i ) or (1
∗
i , 1
∗
i ). However,
in the case, 0j = 1j = bj = ¬bj and he gains nothing.
The construction is semantically secure because ElGamal
encryption is semantically secure under decisional Diffie-
Hellman (DDH) assumption [20]. Therefore, the above
construction satisfies all requirements.
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